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Abstract
The United States imprisons an enormous number of people.
Imprisonment in the United States is not only mass, but also unequal by race,
sex, and class. Over the last several years, criminal reform advocates,
scholars, and the public have paid greater attention to the potential of elected
prosecutors to fix the massive and unequal harms our criminal legal system
imposes on people. To do so, some jurisdictions have elected those who are
popularly called progressive prosecutors to enforce criminal law. I estimate
that roughly 15% of U.S. residents now live in a jurisdiction with a
progressive prosecutor, although that term is difficult to define.1
This Essay presents early evidence suggesting that progressive
prosecutorial reforms have not always been as effective as hoped at reducing
incarceration. Why not? As this Essay describes, reform-minded prosecutors
might fall prey to two phenomena. First, prosecutorial reforms sometimes
replicate lenient treatment that was already happening. I call this the
redundant leniency problem. Second, reforms implemented by progressive
prosecutors sometimes underestimate the redundant punishment that persists
in many criminal legal regimes. That is, progressive policies sometimes fail
to account for the ways in which different parts of our criminal legal systems
reinforce each other, leaving less room than expected for the prosecutorial
reform to bring about meaningful change. And, as many scholars have
pointed out, carceral systems outside the criminal legal system also work in
tandem with the criminal system to perpetuate mass, unequal incarceration.
Taken together, these critiques suggest that progressive prosecutors must
pursue reforms that are both systemic and far-reaching if they hope to
dramatically reduce incarceration in their jurisdictions.
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Introduction
The United States has long had one of the world’s largest prison
populations, both in raw numbers and as a percentage of its population.2
Incarceration in the United States is not only mass, but also unequal. In 2019,
Black residents were imprisoned at more than five times the rate of White
residents; Hispanic residents were imprisoned at roughly two and a half times

2. John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate Falls to Lowest Level Since 1995, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/08/16/americasincarceration-rate-lowest-since-1995/ (reporting that as of 2019, “the United States
incarcerates a larger share of its population than any other country for which data is available).
But see Highest to Lowest – Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, https://www.|
prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All
(last visited Oct. 20, 2022) (reporting that the United States now has the second largest prison
population of roughly 1.68 million, while China has the largest with a prison population of
1.69 million); Highest to Lowest – Prison Population Rate, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, https://
www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_
tid=All (last visited Oct. 20, 2022) (showing the United States has the fifth highest
incarceration rate after El Salvador, Rwanda, Turkmenistan, and Cuba).
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the rate of White residents.3 Imprisonment rates are also disparate by sex,
class, and geography. For example, in 2019, Louisiana imprisoned people at
a higher rate than any other state (1,330 per 100,000 adults) and at more than
four times the rate of the states that imprison the lowest shares of their adult
populations.4
After rapid growth beginning in the 1980s,5 the U.S. prison population has
declined every year since 2014.6 Yet we still imprison more than three times
as many people as we did fifty years ago.7 At the current pace, it will take
seventy-five years to cut our prison population in half.8
Many observers believe prosecutors shoulder the blame for mass and
unequal incarceration, but some also believe that prosecutors are uniquely
suited to fix this critical social problem. This Essay examines the work
reform-minded prosecutors have done thus far to reduce mass and unequal
incarceration. It does so by bringing together and building upon the work of
legal theorists, doctrinal scholars, and empirical researchers. It proceeds in
three parts. First, it describes the role of prosecutors in creating mass and
unequal incarceration. Second, it documents the rise of “progressive
prosecutors” in the 2010s and 2020s and describes three broad ways that
prosecutors might help reduce the prison population: by bringing fewer
criminal cases, by advocating for shorter sentences, and by supporting
decarceration efforts. Third, this Essay presents two hurdles that progressive
prosecutors might face in addressing mass and unequal incarceration—
redundant leniency and redundant punishment. It then offers three case
3. See John Gramlich, Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S. Has Fallen by a Third Since
2006, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/
06/share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-in-prison-2018-vs-2006/.
4. TODD D. MINTON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2019 – STATISTICAL TABLES 11–12 (2021),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/cpus19st.pdf (reporting for
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont, imprisonment rates of 310, 320, and 320 per
100,000 adult residents, respectively).
5. Joshua Aiken, Era of Mass Expansion: Why State Officials Should Fight Jail Growth,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 31, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/jailsover
time.html.
6. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN
2020 – STATISTICAL TABLES 7 (2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p20st.pdf.
7. In 2020, the imprisonment rate was 358 per 100,000 residents. CARSON, supra note
6, at 13. In 1970, it was ninety-six per 100,000 residents. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS
1925–81, at 2 (1982), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf.
8. Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Can We Wait 75 Years to Cut the Prison Population in Half?,
SENT’G PROJECT (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/can-wait-75years-cut-prison-population-half/.
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studies that illustrate these hurdles and ends by arguing that if prosecutors
hope to meaningfully address mass, unequal incarceration, they must pursue
reforms that are both systemic and far-reaching.
I. Prosecutors as a Cause of Mass and Unequal Incarceration
Many observers believe prosecutors are to blame for mass and unequal
imprisonment in the United States but also acknowledge that prosecutors
might be well suited to help fix this problem given their tremendous
discretionary power. Angela Davis explained, “Historically prosecutors are
largely responsible for a lot of the problems we have in the criminal justice
system,” but “[t]hey also have the power to correct them.”9 This Part situates
the role of prosecutors among other actors in creating and maintaining mass
and unequal incarceration in the United States.
That prosecutors are to blame for mass and unequal incarceration in the
United States might seem like an unremarkable proposition. Because
prosecutors have discretion to decide which cases to bring, every person who
is imprisoned in the United States ended up in prison because of a
prosecutorial decision to pursue a conviction. By this logic, the United States
could have zero incarcerated people if prosecutors wanted it to be so. For this
reason, prosecutors have been described as “the most powerful actors”10 and
the “real lawmakers”11 in the criminal legal system.12
Not only do prosecutors have discretion over who is imprisoned, they also
influence how long a person is imprisoned.13 This is because prosecutors
engage in plea bargaining, which is the way most criminal cases in the United
States are resolved.14 In many pleas, the prosecution and defense will agree
9. Del Quentin Wilber, Once Tough-on-Crime Prosecutors Now Push Progressive
Reforms, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019, 4:00 AM PT), https://www.latimes.com/politics/
story/2019-08-02/once-tough-on-crime-prosecutors-now-push-progressive-reforms (quoting
Angela J. Davis).
10. Brandon Hasbrouck, The Just Prosecutor, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 627, 627 (2021).
11. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
506 (2001).
12. But see Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 181 (2019)
(“[I]t takes a village to send someone to prison. The track is laid by legislators and passes
through critical gateways controlled by police, judges, and other actors.” (footnote omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004).
14. John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who
Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
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that the prosecutor will recommend a certain sentence.15 Even in cases in
which the prosecutor and defense bargain over guilt alone, the prosecutor’s
choice of charges and formal recommendation at the sentencing stage will
heavily influence the defendant’s ultimate sentence.
Of course, prosecutors are not the only people who contribute to mass,
unequal incarceration in the United States. Judges approve guilty pleas and
impose sentences on defendants. Legislators create the substantive criminal
laws that prosecutors enforce, and criminal statutes define not only crimes,
but also punishments. Legislators can constrain prosecutors and judges from
imposing the sentences they would prefer by legislating statutory minimum
and maximum terms of imprisonment.16
But this Essay focuses on prosecutors. What influences their behavior? In
many cases, the electorate. This is because in the United States, nearly all
district attorneys are elected.17
Because most district attorneys in the United States are elected,
prosecutorial decision-making likely responds to public attitudes about
tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-arefound-guilty/ (reporting that ninety percent of federal defendants pleaded guilty in fiscal year
2018, while two percent went to trial and eight percent had their charges dismissed by the
government); BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 24 (2013), https://bjs.
ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf (reporting that 53% of felony defendants in the seventyfive largest counties pleaded guilty in 2009, while 2% went to trial, 25% had their charges
dismissed by the government, and 9% had some other outcome).
15. See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 28, 2021), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_c
ourts_work/pleabargaining/.
16. Prosecutors sometimes appear to use statutory minima strategically, such as by
charging a statutory minimum upon learning that the case has been assigned to a more lenient
judge, or by using the threat of a long statutory minimum to induce a defendant to plead guilty.
See Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory
Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1325–26 (2014).
Prosecutors also charge mandatory minima in racially disparate ways. M. Marit Rehavi &
Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320
(2014); Cody Tuttle, Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing: Evidence from Drug
Mandatory Minimums (Aug. 18, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://codytuttle.github.io/
tuttle_mandatory_minimums.pdf; Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and
Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (2015).
17. When Does Each County Elect Its Prosecutor and Sheriff?, APPEAL, https://theappeal.
org/political-report/when-are-elections-for-prosecutor-and-sheriff/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2022)
(indicating that five states—Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode Island—
do not elect prosecutors); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking
Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1537, 1549–51 (2020).
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crime.18 Quantitative empirical scholarship lends support to this theory. For
example, Chika Okafor finds—among other things—that criminal sentences
increase in prosecutorial election years and that these election-year increases
are largest in the South, in Republican counties, and in places where the
prosecutorial election is contested.19 Okafor concludes that “these findings
suggest DA behavior and sentencing outcomes may respond to voter
preferences—including to racial sentiment and preferences regarding the
harshness of the court system.”20 This finding is consistent with earlier work
finding that defendants face a higher probability of conviction during
prosecutor election years and that Republican district attorneys are associated
with harsher sentences than Democrats.21 Researchers have also documented
similar electoral and political effects on judicial decision-making in criminal
cases.22
What does the electorate want from its prosecutors? It’s complicated and
varies across the United States. As described in Section II.A, the electorates
of some jurisdictions have supported prosecutorial visions of reduced
incarceration and increased racial equality.
Overall, though, Americans as a whole hold notoriously punitive attitudes
about crime, although punitive attitudes have declined over the last several
decades. For example, in the past thirty years, the fraction of Americans
viewing the criminal legal system as “not tough enough” has fallen by nearly
half, while the fraction viewing it as “too tough” has increased roughly ten-

18. But see Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 605
(2014) (arguing that prosecutorial elections are “highly imperfect mechanisms to promote
accountability” for prosecutors).
19. Chika O. Okafor, Prosecutor Politics: The Impact of Election Cycles on Criminal
Sentencing in the Era of Rising Incarceration 28–33 (July 4, 2022) (unpublished manuscript),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/okafor/files/prosecutorpolitics.pdf. This study does not,
however, account for the possibility that judicial (rather than prosecutorial) elections could be
driving the results.
20. Id. at i (abstract).
21. Andrew Dyke, Electoral Cycles in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 133 PUB.
CHOICE 417, 431 (2007); Sam Krumholz, The Effect of District Attorneys on Local Criminal
Justice Outcomes 3–4 (May 9, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3243162.
22. David Abrams et al., Electoral Sentencing Cycles, J.L., ECON., & ORG., Jan. 12, 2022,
at 1, 3 (advance article), https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab037 [https://perma.cc/P76E32DW]; Alma Cohen & Crystal S. Yang, Judicial Politics and Sentencing Decisions, AM.
ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y, Feb. 2019, at 160, 161; Christian Dippel & Michael Poyker, How
Common Are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 25716, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25716.
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fold according to Gallup’s regular polling.23 But even as recently as 2020,
twice as many U.S. residents (41%) viewed our criminal legal system as “not
tough enough” compared to those who viewed it as “too tough” (21%)24 (in
1992, the numbers were 83% and 2%, respectively25). Along the same lines,
public support for the death penalty is now the lowest it’s been since the early
1970s, but it is still the case that more Americans support (54%) than oppose
(43%) capital punishment.26 Most Americans believe there are too many
people in prison, and a large majority favor expanding alternatives to prison
and reducing imprisonment for people convicted of “nonviolent” crimes.27
But most oppose doing so for people who have been convicted of violent
crimes.28
How do prosecutors implement the electorate’s preferences? The most
important way is through plea bargaining, which is the way most criminal
cases in the United States are resolved. Mandatory-minimum sentences
bolster prosecutorial power in this process, but even without mandatory
minimums, prosecutors have tremendous power in deciding to pursue
charges and negotiate pleas. Part of the reason prosecutors enjoy so much
bargaining power against criminal defendants is that any involvement in the
carceral system (not just imprisonment) is extremely costly to defendants.
For example, there is widespread empirical evidence that people will plead
guilty to avoid or shorten pretrial detention.29 Research by Megan Stevenson
23. Megan Brenan, Fewer Americans Call for Tougher Criminal Justice System, GALLUP
(Nov. 16, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/324164/fewer-americans-call-tougher-crimin
al-justice-system.aspx.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last
visited Aug. 3, 2022).
27. See Morning Consult, National Tracking Poll 3 (Sept. 1–2, 2016), https://cdn3.voxcdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/7052001/160812_topline_Vox_v1_AP.0.pdf (finding strong
support for reducing prison time of non-violent offenders who are at a low risk of committing a
subsequent crime).
28. Id. at 3–4.
29. Will Dobbie et al., The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime,
and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 225
(2018) (finding that pretrial detention increases probability of conviction, primarily through
increase in guilty pleas); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay
Bail Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 511, 532 (2018) (same); Arpit Gupta et
al., The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD.
471, 498 (2016) (finding that assignment of money bail increases likelihood of conviction);
Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case
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and Sandra Mayson presents evidence that people are very averse to spending
even short stints in jail.30 Due to these high costs, defendants who are
factually innocent or who might have valid claims against their prosecution
could still find it in their interest to plead guilty. Moreover, many defendants
who have committed the crime charged fear they will suffer additional
punishment for going to trial.31 Prosecutors thus have tremendous power to
shape convictions and sentences via plea bargaining.
II. Prosecutors as a Potential Solution to Mass and Unequal Incarceration
Because prosecutors have enormous discretion, they are a natural starting
point for reversing mass and unequal incarceration. This Part describes the
rise of elected prosecutors that vow to do exactly that. It then discusses three
ways that prosecutors might, in theory, make a dent in mass and unequal
incarceration. It also acknowledges hurdles of each approach.
A. The Rise of Progressive Prosecutors in the 2010s–2020s
The past decade has seen an upsurge of so-called “progressive
prosecutors” elected in jurisdictions around the United States. For purposes
of this Essay, I define a progressive prosecutor as a chief prosecutor of a
jurisdiction who claims to want to use the power of their office to reduce
incarceration and inequality. This definition is fairly broad; for example, it
does not require the prosecutor to actually achieve these objectives, and it
allows prosecutors to self-identify as progressive prosecutors.32 The
definition is also probably underinclusive because there are likely to be
prosecutors who eschew the “progressive prosecutor” label but maintain the

Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529, 530 (2017)
(finding that pretrial detention increases probability of conviction).
30. Megan T. Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and the Value of
Liberty, 108 VA. L. REV. 709, 714 (2022).
31. In the federal criminal system, for example, defendants are entitled to a sentencing
reduction if they accept responsibility for their crimes by quickly pleading guilty. See U.S.
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021). But see David S. Abrams,
Putting the Trial Penalty on Trial, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 777 (2013) (arguing that popular
conceptions of the trial penalty are based on “a fundamental misunderstanding,” namely “the
failure to distinguish between conditional and unconditional expected values,” and finding
that the empirical evidence supports the presence of a “trial discount” rather than a trial
penalty).
32. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1362, 1372 (2021) (“The movement
to elect progressive prosecutors has grown powerful enough that some prosecutors try to claim
the label to boost their credibility with certain constituencies.”)
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goal of reducing incarceration and inequality in their jurisdictions.33 Many of
the United States’ largest cities, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and
Philadelphia, now have a progressive prosecutor as I use that term.34 Yet, as
described in more detail below, the vast majority of U.S. residents do not live
in a jurisdiction with a progressive prosecutor.35
Most scholars who study the progressive prosecutor movement view it as
having started in the 2010s. As David Alan Sklansky describes this period,
“with remarkable speed . . . [i]ncumbent prosecutors began to be defeated by
candidates who pledged restraint and moderation in charging practices and
sentencing recommendations, along with more scrutiny of the police, greater
vigilance against prosecutorial misconduct, and a new focus on racial
equity.”36
Sklansky lists three reforms that are typical of progressive prosecutors:
bail reform, not seeking the death penalty, and not prosecuting low-level drug
offenses.37 Progressive prosecutors appear less uniformly interested in
reducing sentences for violent crime. For example, the reelection campaign
website for Kim Foxx—the state’s attorney for Cook County, Illinois—
includes “Taking on Violent Crime” as the second of four “priorities” (the
other three are “Criminal Justice Reform,” “Righting the Wrongs of the War
on Drugs,” and “Standing up to President Donald Trump and the FOP
[Fraternal Order of Police].”)38 Her website boasts that her office has
“worked to enact bail reform and stop the overcrowding of our jails by
prioritizing the detainment of those that pose a threat to our communities”
and describes other accomplishments from her first term, such as exonerating
eighty wrongfully convicted people, reforming how unpaid traffic tickets are
prosecuted, and expunging the records of over one thousand people
convicted of low-level cannabis offenses.39

33. See, e.g., Hessick & Morse, supra note 17, at 1541 (noting this concern that “the label
‘progressive’ may alienate [those] who support criminal justice reform, but who do not
identify as politically progressive or liberal”).
34. Id. at 1542.
35. See infra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
36. David Alan Sklansky, Foreword: The Future of the Progressive Prosecutor
Movement, 16 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. i, i (2021), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2021/08/Sklansky-The-Future-of-the-Progressive-Prosecutor-Movement-16-Stan.J.-C.R.-C.L.-i-2021.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Priorities, KIM FOXX FOR COOK CNTY. STATE’S ATT’Y, https://www.kimfoxx.com/
priorities (last visited Aug. 4, 2022).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
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In contrast, George Gascón, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County
(and previously the District Attorney of San Francisco County) implemented
“sweeping changes” upon taking office in 2020.40 These announcements
included familiar parts of the progressive prosecutor playbook:41 calling for
abolition of the death penalty; an end to most uses of cash bail for
misdemeanor, nonserious, or nonviolent felony offenses; and consideration
of resentencing for inmates serving excessive sentences.42 But Gascón also
included a more expansive and less common reform: instructing prosecutors
to stop charging sentencing enhancements.43 Gascón’s office projects that the
first three months of this policy reduced future prison sentences by a little
over 8,000 years and will ultimately save state prisons around $664 million.44
Some progressive prosecutors have already suffered setbacks. Perhaps
most notably, Chesa Boudin, a progressive candidate who was elected to be
San Francisco’s district attorney in 2019, was recalled by voters in June of
2022.45 The campaign to recall Boudin was heavily funded by Republican
and conservative-leaning donors and emphasized San Francisco’s rising
homelessness and property crime rate to motivate the electorate.46 For
40. Brakkton Booker, George Gascón Implements Sweeping Changes to Los Angeles
District Attorney’s Office, NPR (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/08/9443964
95/george-gascon-implements-sweeping-changes-to-los-angeles-district-attorneys-offi;
San Francisco District Attorney Gascon Resigns; Signals Move to LA, CBS NEWS (Oct. 3,
2019, 6:44 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/sanfrancisco/news/san-francisco-district-attor
ney-gascon-resigns-job/.
41. See generally David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2017).
42. See, e.g., Booker, supra note 40.
43. See, e.g., id.; Special Directive from George Gascón, Dist. Att’y, to All Deputy Dist.
Att’ys (Dec. 7, 2020), https://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/SPECIAL-DIRECTIVE20-08.pdf [hereinafter Special Directive from Gascón] (addressing sentencing enhancements
and allegations).
44. Frank Stoltze, DA Gascón: In 3 Months, I’ve Cut Prison Sentences By More Than
8,000 Years, LAIST (Mar. 17, 2021, 2:46 PM), https://laist.com/news/los-angeles-da-georgegascon-in-3-months-cut-prison-sentences-8-000-years. An analysis by researchers at the
Stanford Computational Policy Lab similarly showed that sentencing enhancements are
responsible for more than 25% of prison time served for felony sentences in San Francisco.
See Elan Dagenais et al., Sentencing Enhancements and Incarceration: San Francisco, 20052017, STAN. COMPUTATIONAL POL’Y LAB, Oct. 2019, at 3, https://policylab.stanford.edu/
media/enhancements_2019-10-17.pdf.
45. Megan Cassidy et al., Chesa Boudin Ousted As San Francisco District Attorney in
Historic Recall, S.F. CHRON. (June 13, 2022, 12:03 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
election/article/Chesa-Boudin-ousted-as-San-Francisco-District-17226641.php.
46. See, e.g., Poll: San Francisco Residents Consider Relocating as Crime Worsens,
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example, the first sentence of the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board’s
endorsement of the recall asserted (without citation): “Crime has surged in
many big American cities, and one reason is the rise of progressive
prosecutors who refuse to enforce criminal laws.”47 Other progressive
prosecutors have faced similar attacks, but many have warded them off.48
Even when popular within their own jurisdictions, some reformist
prosecutors have faced opposition from state officials. For example, thenGovernor Rick Scott removed Aramis Ayala, the elected State Attorney for
two Florida counties, from several murder cases because she announced an
official policy not to seek the death penalty.49 Current Florida Governor Ron
DeSantis suspended the elected State Attorney for a different county after
that prosecutor pledged not to prosecute people who seek abortions or doctors
who perform them, nor to prosecute families seeking gender-affirming care
for their children.50
Another intrinsic limitation to progressive prosecutors’ potential to reduce
mass, unequal incarceration is the fact that progressive prosecutors do not
blanket the United States. The Appendix presents a list created by the author
of progressive prosecutors in the United States. According to the numbers
Quality of Life in a Decline, CBS NEWS (June 30, 2021, 5:36 AM), https://www.cbsnews.
com/sanfrancisco/news/poll-san-francisco-residents-consider-relocating-as-crime-worsenquality-of-life-in-a-decline/ (describing a poll released by the San Francisco Chamber of
Commerce that found 80% of residents thought crime had worsened in recent years, 70% felt
their quality of life had declined, and 88% believed homelessness had worsened).
47. The Criminal Streets of San Francisco, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2022, 6:42 PM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-criminal-streets-of-san-francisco-progressive-prosecutorchesa-boudin-crime-cities-11653855019.
48. For example, Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner defeated a Democratic
primary challenger, Carlos Vega, in 2021 despite his opponent’s attempts to “paint [Krasner]
as soft on crime.” Jon Hurdle & Jonah E. Bromwich, Victory in Philadelphia Buoys Supporters
of Progressive District Attorney, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/05/19/us/krasner-vega-philadelphia.html. Diana Becton, the District Attorney of
Contra Costa County, California, similarly defeated a well-funded challenger in 2022. Contra
Costa County District Attorney Diana Becton Holds Off Challenger Mary Knox, NBC (June
8, 2022, 11:09 AM), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/decision-2022/contra-costa-countydistrict-attorney-diana-becton-holds-off-challenger-mary-knox/2913945/.
49. Florida Supreme Court Upholds Removal of Prosecutor from Death-Eligible Cases,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 31, 2017), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/floridasupreme-court-upholds-removal-of-prosecutor-from-death-eligible-cases.
50. Brendan Farrington & Anthony Izaguirre, DeSantis Sued by Florida Prosecutor He
Removed Over Abortion (Aug. 17, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-electionsabortion-lawsuits-florida-8c311d5742140575bdd456307ac7d488. For a general treatment of
the “preemption” of progressive prosecutors by other state actors, see Nicholas Goldrosen,
The New Preemption of Progressive Prosecutors, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 150.
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reported in the Appendix, jurisdictions with a progressive prosecutor
comprise roughly 15% of the American public.51 Put another way, around six
out of seven U.S. residents do not live in a jurisdiction with a progressive
prosecutor. Even if progressive prosecutors are extraordinarily effective at
reducing incarceration in their jurisdictions, this will not help the vast
majority of American prisoners.52 Therefore, the focus of this Essay is
constrained. It asks, at best, can progressive prosecutors meaningfully affect
mass and racially disparate incarceration of defendants prosecuted in their
jurisdictions? The rest of this Essay considers this question.
B. Prosecutorial Tactics to Reduce Mass and Unequal Incarceration
Broadly speaking, there are three ways to reduce the size of an
incarcerated population. The first is to reduce the number of people entering
prison. The second is to reduce the sentences for those entering prison. The
third is to release people from prison. Any of these three mechanisms alone
will reduce the prison population; but the prison population will decline faster
if all three tactics are used simultaneously.53 It is also important to note that
even if a prosecutor adopts strategies that are effective at reducing the prison

51. See infra app. A. This estimate is similar to others. See, e.g., EMILY BAZELON,
CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS
INCARCERATION 290 (2019) (asserting that 12% of the U.S. population lives in a jurisdiction
with a “reformer” district attorney); LARRY KRASNER, FOR THE PEOPLE: A STORY OF JUSTICE
AND POWER 311 (2022) (“[B]y 2021, about 20.1 percent of the U.S. population lived in
jurisdictions that had elected or reelected a progressive prosecutor.”).
52. See, e.g., Maybell Romero, Rural Spaces, Communities of Color, and the Progressive
Prosecutor, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 803 (2020) (warning that “[prosecutorial]
reforms that occur in large jurisdictions sometimes do not extend to those suffering injustices
in small communities”); KIM TAYLOR-THOMPSON & ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, PROGRESSIVE
PROSECUTION: RACE AND REFORM IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (2022) (“The few dozen
[progressive] prosecutors who have been elected cannot possibly reform and transform the
system by themselves. Their numbers are far too small to create sustainable change in the
justice system.”).
53. See generally Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration:
Implications of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 308 (2009)
(defining “the iron law of prison populations” as the fact “that the total number of prisoners
behind bars is purely and simply a result of two factors: the number of people put there and
how long they stay”); Ben Grunwald, Toward an Optimal Decarceration Strategy, 33 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2022) (describing different strategies to reduce the prison population and
metrics by which to judge them).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol75/iss1/4

2022]

REDUNDANT LENIENCY AND PUNISHMENT

37

population, it does not automatically follow that imprisonment rates will
become less disparate.54
As this Section describes, prosecutors play a role in each of these
mechanisms. Most obviously, prosecutors can reduce the number of people
entering prison by charging fewer people with crimes. Prosecutors can also
lessen sentences for those entering prison through plea bargaining and
charging decisions. Finally, prosecutors can increase the number of people
released from prison in many ways, such as by supporting motions for
compassionate release or revisiting long sentences.
1. Declinations: Reducing the Number of People Entering Prison
Prosecutors can reduce the prison population by reducing the number of
people they prosecute for crimes. One way that prosecutors sometimes do
this is by announcing that they will decline to prosecute certain crimes, such
as possession of small amounts of cannabis.55 As another example, in the
wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization, many district attorneys announced that their offices
would not prosecute abortion providers or people who obtained abortions.56
In Georgia, one prosecutor announced that his office would not prosecute
anyone under a newly enacted law that criminalizes providing food and water

54. Daniel Fryer, Race, Reform, & Progressive Prosecution, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 769, 772 (2020) (arguing that progressive prosecutors “often articulate neutral
principles that are susceptible to being used in a racially discriminatory manner”).
55. See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn Prosecutor Limits When
He’ll Target Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/
09/nyregion/brooklyn-district-attorney-to-stop-prosecuting-low-level-marijuana-cases.html;
Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Baltimore State’s Attorney Will No Longer Prosecute Marijuana
Possession Cases, NPR (Feb. 3, 2019, 7:39 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/03/
690975390/baltimore-states-attorney-will-no-longer-prosecute-marijuana-possession-cases;
Travis Loller & Jonathan Mattise, Nashville Will No Longer Prosecute Minor Marijuana
Charges, AP NEWS (July 1, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/9ce3b3975625e0b16ddfc076
e88d9ea1.
56. Michael Atwell et al., Fair & Just Prosecution, Joint Statement from Elected
Prosecutors (July 25, 2022), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/
FJP-Post-Dobbs-Abortion-Joint-Statement.pdf (collecting signatures from ninety-two elected
prosecutors at the time of writing).
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to voters waiting in line to cast their ballots.57 Some scholars refer to these
efforts as “prosecutorial nullification” or “prosecutorial decriminalization.”58
Aside from blanket, crime-specific declinations, prosecutors can elect to
simply not bring criminal charges in cases that are viewed as less serious. For
example, the federal government often states that it prioritizes prosecuting
more egregious crimes, especially for crimes over which states will also have
jurisdiction (such as drug crimes and financial crimes).59
2. Leniency Directives: Reducing Sentences for Those Convicted
Prosecutors can also reduce the prison population by working to obtain
lesser sentences for those whom they prosecute for crimes.60 I define a
leniency directive as an order from a chief prosecutor (such as a district
attorney) that instructs prosecutors to not prosecute certain defendants or
crimes to the fullest extent possible under the law.61 Leniency directives are
57. Arielle Kass, Gwinnett Solicitor Says He Won’t Prosecute People for Giving Voters
Water, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta-news/gwinnettsolicitor-says-he-wont-prosecute-people-for-giving-voters-water/KLPNOM3RPZEIZHKBU
2IE4LU3IU/.
58. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243,
1252 (2011); Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
785 (2012); W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 173,
179 (2021); see also Justin Murray, Prosecutorial Nonenforcement and Residual
Criminalization, 19 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2022) (arguing that “residual
criminalization” can persist even after a reform-minded prosecutor promulgates a nonenforcement policy).
59. See generally Lauren M. Ouziel, Ambition and Fruition in Federal Criminal Law: A
Case Study, 103 VA. L. REV. 1077 (2017); White-Collar Crime, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/
investigate/white-collar-crime (“The FBI’s white-collar crime program focuses on analyzing
intelligence and solving complex investigations—often with a connection to organized crime
activities. Our white-collar crime investigations can be regional, national, and/or
international.”).
60. One analysis found that criminal cases decided in jurisdictions led by a progressive
prosecutor were “more likely to end without a felony conviction and less likely to result in a
prison sentence.” Ojmarrh Mitchell et al., Are Progressive Chief Prosecutors Effective in
Reducing Prison Use and Cumulative Racial/Ethnic Disadvantage? Evidence from Florida,
21 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 535, 535 (2022). The authors also found that racial disparities
are smaller in jurisdictions led by progressive chief prosecutors. Id. at 560. These results
should be interpreted with caution because whether a jurisdiction has a progressive chief
prosecutor is a selected outcome that is likely to be correlated—perhaps not causally—with
the outcomes studied.
61. I use the term “lenient” to refer to the situation in which the prosecutor does not
prosecute someone to the fullest extent allowed by the law. For a critique of using this term,
see Anna Roberts, Criminal Terms, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/
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a popular tool among progressive prosecutors. For example, George Gascón,
the District Attorney for Los Angeles, instructed prosecutors in his office to
stop pursuing enhanced sentences under California’s Three Strikes Law.62 As
another example, described in detail in Section III.C.2, then-Attorney
General Eric Holder instructed federal prosecutors in 2013 to stop charging
mandatory minimums in certain drug trafficking cases.63 The Holder policy
is another example of a leniency directive.
Leniency directives have a political economy. Typically, the most
politically feasible leniency directive is one aimed at those defendants who
are seen as the most deserving in the eyes of the public. Such defendants tend
to be those charged with offenses involving low-level conduct, those with
little or no criminal record, and those with no prior convictions for physically
violent crimes. Even for elected progressive prosecutors, merciful treatment
might not be politically feasible for defendants convicted of serious crimes
or with a prior criminal record.64
Thus, while politically palatable, we might not expect low-level leniency
to be an effective tool at making a dent in mass and unequal incarceration.
First, and perhaps most obviously, at any given moment, most people
imprisoned in the United States are serving sentences for convictions of
violent crimes.65
Second, and perhaps overlooked, is that prosecutors might already be
exercising leniency in these cases. For progressive prosecutors, the chance of
redundancy could be inflated by selection bias: progressive prosecutors are
most likely to be elected in locations where the populace already holds
progressive views about the criminal legal system.
Third, prosecutors are resource constrained. As a leading criminal law
casebook explains,
Criminal statutes now commonly permit (or purport to require)
draconian punishments that no one expects to be imposed in the
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4135537 (manuscript at 28) (“‘Lenient’ is another common term
in academia that bolsters the criminal apparatus by suggesting the state’s benevolence.”).
62. See Special Directive from Gascón, supra note 43.
63. See infra Section III.C.2.
64. Some have criticized mercy for its capricious implementation. See, e.g., Dan Markel,
Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1436 (2004) (“Mercy [is] the remission of deserved
punishment, in part or in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of characteristics that evoke
compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender’s competence and
ability to choose to engage in criminal conduct.”).
65. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM viii (2017).
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typical case. . . . “Leniency” has therefore become not merely
common but a systemic imperative. Under these circumstances,
the decision to “withhold leniency” is effectively a decision to
impose severe punishment.66
In other words, progressive prosecutors might implement measures that are
duplicative of prior informal leniency policies. This Essay calls this the
redundant leniency problem in Part III.
It is also important to note that traditionally, prosecutorial leniency has
been disproportionately directed towards certain people—those with social
power—and has therefore often benefited race-, sex-, and class-privileged
people. As Kenneth Culp said, “[T]he power to be lenient is the power to
discriminate.”67 Thus, a leniency directive that reduces the prison population
as a whole might do little to address inequality.
3. Prosecutorial Approaches to Decarceration
Finally, prosecutors can reduce the prison population by encouraging
decarceration—the process by which people leave prison in a way other than
by serving their full sentence. Decarceration takes many forms, which this
subsection describes. Although several decarceral avenues exist in the law,
prosecutors typically do not revisit sentences in closed cases.68
Decarceration often takes the form of compassionate release, a process
that allows imprisoned people to be released early from a prison term if they
have a serious or terminal medical condition.69 Prosecutors play an important
role in the compassionate-release process. Ex post, a prisoner’s motion for
compassionate release will involve the prosecutor’s office, which can choose
to oppose or support compassionate release.
Prosecutors also affect compassionate release ex ante. In some
jurisdictions, prosecutors require defendants to waive their ability to later
seek compassionate release as part of the plea-bargaining process70—a
66. SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 77–78 (10th ed. 2016).
67. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 170 (1969)
(emphasis omitted).
68. Rory Fleming, Prosecutor-Driven “Second Look” Policies Are Encouraging, but Not
a Panacea, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 205, 205 (2020).
69. See generally Renagh O’Leary, Compassionate Release and Decarceration in the
States, 107 IOWA L. REV 621 (2022).
70. Carrie Johnson, Justice Department Ends Limiting Compassionate Release in Plea
Deals After NPR Story, NPR (Mar. 11, 2022, 5:23 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2022/
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practice that “aggravates the most coercive aspects of plea bargaining by
requiring an accused to waive the opportunity to seek relief for future,
unknown, and unpredictable personal or familial tragedies including terminal
diagnoses.”71 In March 2022, the Department of Justice banned federal
prosecutors from engaging in this practice outside of “select instances,” such
as “exceptionally rare” terrorism and homicide cases.72
Progressive prosecutors have touted other decarceration strategies. Some
have set up conviction integrity units (sometimes called conviction review
units) to “prevent, identify, and remedy false convictions.”73 According to
the National Registry of Exonerations, there are around ninety-five
conviction integrity units in the United States, but a little less than half have
ever recorded an exoneration.74 Some reform prosecutors have also set up
sentence review units that revisit the sentences of people who are currently
serving exceptionally long sentences—not because the prosecutor
necessarily believes the prisoner is innocent, but because they believe the
sentence might be unjustly long.75 Although these strategies provide
important relief to those they help, they are unlikely to make a significant
dent in mass and unequal incarceration because the number of people helped
is very small relative to the size of the prison population. As Renagh O’Leary
describes, “progress toward decarceration has been exceedingly modest.”76

03/11/1086140965/justice-department-ends-limiting-compassionate-release-in-plea-dealsafter-npr-s (reporting that compassionate release waivers have been used in Arizona, Illinois,
Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee).
71. Letter from Kevin A. Ring, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws., and Martín
Sabelli, President, FAMM, to Lisa Monaco, Deputy Att’y Gen. (Feb. 15, 2022), https://famm.
org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-DAG-Plea-Agmt_2.15_FAMM.NACDL_FINAL17.pdf
(citing United States v. Osorto, 445 F. Supp. 3d 103, 105, 107, 110 (N.D. Cal. 2020)).
72. Memorandum from Lisa Monaco, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors
(Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/file/1482956/download.
73. Conviction Integrity Units, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Conviction-Integrity-Units.aspx (listing known conviction
integrity units in the United States) [hereinafter Conviction Integrity Units]; Carla D. Pratt,
Hip Hop Prosecutors Heed the Call for Criminal Justice Reform, in HIP HOP AND THE LAW 87
(Pamela Bridgewater et al. eds., 2019) (describing Dallas District Attorney Craig Watkins’
creation of the first conviction integrity unit in the United States).
74. Conviction Integrity Units, supra note 73.
75. See, e.g., State’s Attorney Kim Fox Announces New Resentencing Initiative, CHI.
DEFENDER (Mar. 18, 2022), https://chicagodefender.com/states-attorney-kim-fox-announcesnew-resentencing-initiative/ (describing efforts by Cook County State’s Attorney Kim Foxx
to identify incarcerated prisoners for resentencing).
76. O’Leary, supra note 69, at 631.
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III. Redundant Leniency and Redundant Punishment
Many advocates and scholars have raised what are now familiar but
important concerns about the obstacles prosecutors are likely to face in
efforts to reduce mass and unequal incarceration. For example, many worry
that reform-minded prosecutors will face political pressures, pressures from
other branches of government, or internal resistance to a progressive agenda
for reasons described in Part II. This Part presents two additional hurdles that
prosecutors are likely to face in efforts to reduce mass and unequal
incarceration: redundant leniency and redundant punishment. This Part ends
with three case studies that illustrate these two phenomena.
A. Redundant Leniency
People impacted by the criminal system, advocates, and scholars have
long recognized that one obstacle to transformational change in the criminal
space is that reforms often help those the public views as the most deserving
of lenient treatment. These constituencies often include people without
criminal records and those whose crimes are nonsexual and nonviolent.
For example, most of the U.S. public believes there are too many people
in prison, and a large majority of the public favors expanding alternatives to
prison and reducing imprisonment for people convicted of “nonviolent”
crimes and who have a low risk of committing another crime.77 But most also
oppose doing so for people who have been convicted of a “violent” crime
and have a low risk of committing another crime.78 Most Americans might
not realize that these twin goals—significantly reducing the prison
population while holding constant the way the system punishes people
convicted of violent crimes—are difficult to reconcile in reality.79
The redundant leniency problem goes a step further than offering lesser
punitiveness to those viewed as most deserving. The redundant leniency
77. Morning Consult, supra note 27, at 3.
78. Id. at 3.
79. I do not mean to suggest we should ignore the criminal system’s punitiveness towards
those arrested and/or prosecuted for low-level, nonviolent crimes. But those reforms do little
to reduce mass incarceration. This does not mean that such reforms are unimportant, but it
does mean they are insufficient to meaningfully reduce the number of people imprisoned in
the United States. See generally Dana Goldstein, How to Cut the Prison Population by 50
Percent, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 4, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2015/03/04/how-to-cut-the-prison-population-by-50-percent (noting that to cut the prison
population in half “would entail touching what has long been a third-rail in criminal justice
reform. To halve the prison population, sentencing would have to change not only for the socalled ‘non, non, nons’—non-violent, non-serious, and non-sex offender criminals—but also
for some offenders convicted of violent crimes.”).
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problem exists when a progressive prosecutor implements a reform of
leniency that was already happening in their jurisdiction.
Even before the rise of progressive prosecutors, it was never the case that
prosecutors have prosecuted every single person they could to the fullest
extent possible. Instead, it has always been the case that prosecutors decline
to prosecute some cases.80 Redundant leniency exists when progressive
prosecutors implement reforms that either duplicate (or, at least, overlap)
these prior practices, or when they duplicate preexisting leniency created by
other actors like legislators or judges.81
The rhetoric many progressive prosecutors employ suggests that
redundant leniency could be a problem. For example, many progressive
prosecutors express firm unwillingness to reduce punishment of people
convicted of violent crimes.82 This is perhaps an unsurprising position for a
progressive prosecutor to take—progressive prosecutors are almost always
elected by the general public and, as described above, the U.S. public reports
favoring long sentences for people convicted of “violent” crimes.83 But it
impedes a progressive prosecutor’s ability to meaningfully reduce
incarceration and suggests some progressive reforms could duplicate preexisting but unspoken lenient treatment.
B. Redundant Punishment
Progressive prosecutors also must grapple with redundant punishment in
the carceral systems within which they operate. In myriad ways, carceral

80. Federal Prosecutors: Wide Variation Found in Handling of Criminal Referrals for
Prosecution, TRAC REPORTS (Jan. 24, 2003), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/pros/ausa_
pctdecG.html (finding that federal prosecutors declined to prosecute around 45,000 cases per
year in the early 2000s).
81. For example, newly elected progressive prosecutor Alvin Bragg promulgated a memo
that listed many crimes that his office would not prosecute. Jonah E. Bromwich, Manhattan D.A.
Acts on Vow to Seek Incarceration Only for Worst Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/06/nyregion/alvin-bragg-manhattan-da.html; Alvin Bragg:
Day 1 Memo, ALVIN BRAGG, https://www.alvinbragg.com/day-one (last visited Aug. 4, 2022).
The list included some crimes—like adultery—that have virtually never been prosecuted. Id.
(categorizing adultery under “outdated offenses”); see also Eamon McNiff, Woman Charged
with Adultery to Challenge New York Law, ABC NEWS (June 8, 2010, 12:17 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/woman-charged-adultery-challenge-york-law/story?id=10857
437 (noting that a woman prosecuted in 2010 was only the thirteenth person in New York history
to be charged with the crime of adultery, five of whom had been convicted).
82. See supra Section II.A.
83. See Morning Consult, supra note 27, at 3.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

44

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:25

systems in the United States interact and reinforce each other.84 The
redundant punishment obstacle hinders progressive prosecutors if their
policy interventions do not dismantle redundant sources of punishment. For
example, a progressive prosecutor might change their office’s approach to
charging, plea bargaining, sentencing, or decarceration, but other actors who
influence incarceration—such as judges, probation or pretrial service
officers, police officers, and legislators—might continue to perpetuate the
carceral system. I refer to this as the redundant punishment obstacle.
C. Three Case Studies
This Section presents three case studies of prosecutorial decision-making
that illustrate the redundant leniency and redundant punishment problems, in
chronological order. The first describes the prosecutorial response to
California’s Three Strikes Law during the 1990s. The second describes a
charging policy that U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder implemented in
2013. The third describes Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner’s bail
reform policy in 2018.
1. Case Study: The Prosecutorial Response to California’s Three Strikes
Law (1994)
In 1994, during the height of the War on Crime, California voters
overwhelmingly passed Proposition 184, which required the California
legislature to enact a three-strikes law.85 Under the law, a person who had
been convicted of three “violent” or “serious” felonies was subject to a
minimum sentence of twenty-five years to life imprisonment.86 In Ewing v.
California, the defendant Gary Ewing challenged his three-strikes sentence
of life imprisonment after being convicted of stealing roughly $1,200 worth
of golf clubs.87 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the law did not violate the
Eighth Amendment.88
Three-strikes laws remove discretion from judges by constraining their
freedom to sentence as they see fit. As a result, these laws necessarily place
84. See, e.g., S. Lisa Washington, Pathology Logics, NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4068859 (manuscript at 1) (explaining
how the “pathologizing of impoverished and racialized groups” is a “logic deeply embedded
in the [family regulation] system,” as in other carceral systems).
85. See Brian Brown & Greg Jolivette, A Primer: Three Strikes – The Impact After More
Than a Decade, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Oct. 2005), https://lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/
3_strikes_102005.htm.
86. Id.
87. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18–20 (2003).
88. Id. at 30–31.
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tremendous power in prosecutors (who select charges). They also
disproportionately affect people of color.89 In Making the Crime Fit the
Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing, David Bjerk examined how California prosecutors responded to
the three-strikes law.90 Bjerk found “that prosecutors become significantly
more likely to lower a defendant’s prosecution charge to a misdemeanor
when conviction for the initial felony arrest charge would lead to sentencing
under a three-strikes law.”91 This finding shows that even at the height of the
1990s War on Crime, some prosecutors opted to charge defendants with
lesser offenses in order to avoid harsh mandatory punishment.
Although Bjerk documented that some prosecutors chose leniency in some
cases, this approach was not evenly spread across California’s population.
As Joshua Bowers described, prosecutors across California varied in how
they applied the three-strikes law, with “each county’s prosecutors
enforc[ing] the law according to their own principles of proportionality.”92
Bowers connects this patchwork of enforcement to earlier work by Michael
Tonry, showing how prosecutors have historically “adapted” to excessively
harsh sentencing regimes by adjusting their charging behavior.93
2. Case Study: Reforming Federal Drug Prosecutions (2013)
In 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder implemented a charging policy
designed to reduce imprisonment of defendants who had minor or no prior
criminal record and were convicted of low-level, nonviolent drug trafficking
offenses.94 The policy was designed to reduce sentences for defendants in
89. Brian Brown & Greg Jolivette, A Primer: Three Strikes – The Impact After More Than
a Decade, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Oct. 2005), https://lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_
102005.htm (noting that as of 2005, the racial composition of second- and third-strikers is
similar to that in the total prison population but that African Americans make up forty-five
percent of the third-striker population, which is fifteen percent higher than their share of the
prison population).
90. David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion
Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 591 (2005).
91. Id.
92. Joshua E. Bowers, Note, “The Integrity of the Game is Everything”: The Problem of
Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1164, 1164 (2001).
93. See id. at 1172 n.52 (citing MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996)); id. at
1173 n.53 (citing MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995)); see also Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, 42 CRIME &
JUST. 141, 168 (2013).
94. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to the U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen.
for the Crim. Div. (Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Memorandum to U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y
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this group because their charges frequently triggered mandatory minimums
due to how the Controlled Substances Act defined culpability in drug cases
based on drug quantity.95 In the memo announcing the policy change, Holder
explained that
[w]e must ensure that our most severe mandatory minimum
penalties are reserved for serious, high-level, or violent drug
traffickers. In some cases, mandatory minimum and recidivist
enhancement statutes have resulted in unduly harsh sentences and
perceived or actual disparities . . . . Long sentences for low-level,
non-violent drug offenses do not promote public safety,
deterrence, and rehabilitation.96
Some might object that Eric Holder is not a “progressive prosecutor,” and
perhaps the federal criminal setting is too different from the state criminal
systems where most criminal prosecutions take place. Although Holder did
not identify as a progressive prosecutor as I define that term above, the
reform he promulgated is the type of reform that many progressive
prosecutors at the state level likely would find appealing. The reform was
likely to be politically unobjectionable (if not popular) because mandatory
minimums are so unpopular. It used the prosecutorial power for leniency but
continued to reserve harsh penalties for the “serious, high-level, or violent”
cases.97
To accomplish this goal of reducing sentences for people convicted of
low-level, nonviolent crimes, Holder instructed federal prosecutors to stop
alleging drug quantity in the indictments of such cases.98 Although the Holder
Gen. for the Crim. Div.], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/
ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhan
cements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf.
95. See id. at 2. In federal criminal cases, a defendant who is part of a conspiracy to
distribute drugs is deemed responsible for the entire quantity trafficked by the conspiracy,
even if the defendant is a relatively minor participant. See, e.g., Matt Alston, Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Might Have a “Girlfriend Problem,” ROLLING STONE (Nov. 18, 2018),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/mandatory-minimum-sentencing-girl
friend-problem-757690 (noting the problem of “long prison sentences given to women
tangentially connected to violent or severe offenders”).
96. Memorandum to U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Div., supra note
94, at 1.
97. See id.
98. Holder implemented this policy change six weeks after the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Alleyne v. United States, which held that any fact that increased the statutory
minimum for a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.; Alleyne v. United
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Memo instructed federal prosecutors to stop charging mandatory minimums
for eligible defendants, it made clear that “[p]rosecutors should continue to
ascertain whether a defendant is eligible for any statutory mandatory
minimum statute or enhancement” and “must be candid with the court,
probation, and the public as to the full extent of the defendant’s culpability,
including the quantity of drugs involved in the offense and the quantity
attributable to the defendant’s role in the offense, even if the charging
document lacks such specificity.”99 In May 2017, however, Attorney General
Jeff Sessions rescinded the charging policy.100
For those working to end mass and unequal incarceration in the United
States, Holder’s policy change was widely—although not universally—
viewed as a promising reform.101 But from the outset, there were many
reasons to think the plan might create only modest results. First, the policy
used prosecutorial power to affect an outcome (sentence length) that is
ultimately decided by another actor—in this case, a district judge. Second,
the policy only applied to certain defendants convicted of low-level crimes.
These are defendants that the criminal system typically treats the most
leniently, raising the threat of redundant leniency. In federal law, for
example, the “safety-valve” provision already allowed many defendants with
little criminal history convicted of low-level drug trafficking crimes to avoid
mandatory minimums.102 Third, Holder’s memo left individual prosecutors
with some discretion as to whether to follow the policy.103 Fourth, the policy
change did not instruct prosecutors to make other changes to how they
prosecute cases—as described above, the policy change instructed
prosecutors to continue proving all relevant information at sentencing, which

States, 570 U.S. 99, 115–16 (2013). After Alleyne, a prosecutor can easily charge a drug
trafficking case in a way that does not trigger a mandatory minimum by omitting from the
indictment any mention of the quantity of drugs involved in the offense. This is what Holder’s
policy instructed prosecutors to do. Memorandum to U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen. for
the Crim. Div., supra note 94, at 2.
99. Memorandum to U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Div., supra note
94, at 2, 3.
100. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors 2, 2 n.1 (May
10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/press-release/file/965896/download.
101. Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Seeks to Curtail Stiff Drug Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/us/justice-dept-seeks-to-curtail-stiff-drugsentences.html.
102. See Safety Valves, FAMM, https://famm.org/our-work/u-s-congress/safety-valves/
(last visited Aug. 4, 2022).
103. Memorandum to U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Div., supra note
94, at 1–2.
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in turn meant the policy change did not affect defendants’ Sentencing
Guidelines ranges. This aspect of the federal criminal legal system suggests
the policy change did not account for redundant punishment.
In other work, I assess the effects of Holder’s policy change.104 I first find
that federal prosecutors around the United States appear to have complied
with the charging policy—mandatory minimum charges fell for defendants
that were likely eligible for charging leniency while remaining stable for
other federal defendants after the policy change was announced.105 However,
sentences for eligible defendants did not change much.106 By most estimates,
they did not change at all.107 I argue that the failure of the Holder policy to
effectively translate charging reductions into sentencing reductions stems
from redundant leniency and redundant punishment.
3. Case Study: Philadelphia Bail Reform (2018)
In 2018, Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner—unquestionably a
progressive prosecutor as I define that term in Part II—announced a new bail
reform initiative.108 Bail reform was a central element of Krasner’s campaign
platform.109 In an effort to reduce the use of cash bond in Philadelphia’s
criminal courts, Krasner’s policy directed the prosecutors in his office to stop
requesting money bail for defendants charged with certain nonviolent
crimes.110 Media coverage of the reform largely characterized it as an
ambitious plan,111 but on its face, several aspects of the plan suggested the
104. Stephanie Holmes Didwania, Charging Leniency and Federal Sentences, (Univ. Wis.
L. Sch. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 1746, 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3556138.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also Jacob Sullum, How Many Drug Offenders Benefited from the Holder
Memo That Sessions Rescinded?, REASON (May 17, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://reason.com/
2017/05/17/how-many-drug-offenders-benefited-from-t/.
108. Jennifer Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasnerscampaign-to-end-mass-incarceration.
109. Max Marin, Philly DA Report Card: The Promises Krasner Kept (or Didn’t) in His
First Term, BILLY PENN (Apr. 25, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://billypenn.com/2021/04/25/
krasner-philadelphia-district-attorney-election-cash-bail-wrongful-convictions/.
110. Malik Neal & Christina Matthias, Broken Promises: Larry Krasner and the
Continuation of Pretrial Punishment in Philadelphia, 16 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 543, 547–48
(2021).
111. See, e.g., Justin Miller, The New Reformer DAs, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://prospect.org/health/new-reformer-das/ (noting “concerns that Krasner was too radical
for even a staunchly Democratic city like Philadelphia”).
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effects would be modest. First, the plan was phrased in the negative rather
than the affirmative—it did not tell prosecutors to request that defendants be
released on recognizance or unsecured bond; rather, it simply told them not
to ask for cash bond.112 Second, like the Holder policy, the bail policy only
applied to certain low-level arrestees rather than all arrestees.113 Third, like
the Holder policy, individual prosecutors retained discretion to request cash
bond in some circumstances.114 Fourth, like the Holder policy, prosecutors
do not make bond decisions, judges do.
Aurélie Ouss and Megan Stevenson assessed the effects of Krasner’s
policy change on pretrial detention in Philadelphia.115 Put simply, their
research design compares bail decisions for eligible versus ineligible
defendants in Philadelphia in time periods before and after the policy change.
Ouss and Stevenson find that the policy did not affect pretrial detention
rates.116 Why not? One might wonder if individual prosecutors rebelled and
did not follow Krasner’s policy, but that does not appear to be the case—
Ouss and Stevenson find evidence of significant compliance by individual
prosecutors. In 70% of eligible cases, compliance took the form of
prosecutorial silence (that is, not making any recommendation to the court)
during the bail hearing.117 In 19% of eligible cases, prosecutors requested
secured money bail despite the charging policy.118 Given that the policy
simply instructed prosecutors not to ask for secured money bail, this
translates into a roughly 80% compliance rate.
Ouss and Stevenson offer a different explanation for their findings. They
notice that, prior to the policy change, the people targeted by Krasner’s bail
reform—those arrested for low-level crimes—were routinely released
pending trial.119 This fact left little room for bail reform to significantly affect
release rates; that is, it was an example of redundant leniency.
Ouss and Stevenson do find one important success—the policy change
appears to have increased the share of defendants released with no secured

112. Larry Krasner Announces End to Cash Bail in Philadelphia for Low-Level Offenses,
PHILA DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://phillyda.wordpress.com/2018/02/21/larrykrasner-announces-end-to-cash-bail-in-philadelphia-for-low-level-offenses/.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Aurélie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The Influence
of Prosecutors (June 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id. at 47, 58.
118. Id. at 47.
119. See id. at 3.
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bond.120 In other words, the reform seemed effective at substituting low bond
amounts for release on recognizance, and this switch apparently did not lead
to any increase in pretrial arrests or failure to appear. As Ouss and Stevenson
explain, this finding calls into question the widespread use of low bond
amounts for low-level defendants.121
Finally, as in Case Study 1, Ouss and Stevenson also analyze how the
policy affected defendants with different racial identities and find that “white
defendants were disproportionately selected” as beneficiaries of the
reform.122
IV. Conclusion
This Essay considered the potential of reform-minded prosecutors to
reduce mass and unequal incarceration in the United States. It identified
several obstacles that reform-minded prosecutors will face. Some of these
obstacles are familiar. Nearly all district attorneys face electoral pressures,
and much of the American public holds punitive attitudes. This reality likely
makes it difficult for many prosecutors to act where intervention could be
most effective at reducing mass and unequal incarceration, such as by
treating defendants who have committed crimes of physical violence less
harshly. Even if a reform-minded district attorney has popular support within
their jurisdiction, they could face opposition from a hostile state legislature
or governor, which might retaliate against reformist policies by stripping the
prosecutor of jurisdiction or firing them. A reform-minded district attorney
might also face opposition from prosecutors within their office or from the
local law enforcement agency with which they must work.
In addition to these familiar concerns, this Essay highlighted two potential
obstacles to prosecutorial reform that have received less attention in the
literature. The first is that “progressive prosecutors” sometimes implement
policies that simply publicize examples of lenient treatment that had existed
long before. I call this the redundant leniency problem. Second, prosecutors
might implement reforms that fail to account for the way that many punitive
aspects of the criminal system reinforce each other. I call this the redundant
punishment problem. Together, both problems suggest that reform-minded
prosecutors must pursue reforms that are both systemic and far-reaching if
they hope to dramatically reduce incarceration in their jurisdictions.

120. See id. at 20–21.
121. Id. at 5.
122. Id. at 28.
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APPENDIX: Progressive Prosecutors in the United States
Name
Dan Satterberg 2
John Chisholm 3
George Gascón 4
Tori Verber Salazar 5
Karl Racine 6
Marilyn Mosby 7
Scott Colom 8
Stephanie Morales 9
Kim Foxx 10
Eric Gonzalez 11
Mark Gonzalez 12
Kim Ogg 13
Diana Becton 14
Kim Gardner 15
Sarah George 16
Mark Dupree 17
Larry Krasner 18
Danny Carr 19
Rachael Rollins 20
John Creuzot 21
Joe Gonzales 22
Wesley Bell 23
Satana Deberry 24
Parisa Dehghani-Tafti 25
Andrea Harrington 26
George Gascón 27
Chesa Boudin 28
Mike Schmidt 29
Jody Owens II 30
Monique Worrell 31
Alvin Bragg 32
José Garza 33
Karen McDonald 34
Laura Conover 35
Jason Williams 36
Eli Savit 37
J.D. Tomlinson 38
Alonzo Payne 39
TOTAL POP (current)40
TOTAL POP (ever)41
% of US POP (current) 42
% of US POP (ever)

Jurisdiction
King County, WA
Milwaukee County, WI
City and County of San Francisco, CA
San Joaquin County, CA
District of Columbia
Baltimore City, MD
16th District (Columbus), MS
Portsmouth, VA
Cook County (Chicago), IL
Kings County (Brooklyn), NY
Nueces County (Corpus Christi), TX
Harris County (Houston), TX
Contra Costa County, CA
St. Louis, MO
Chittenden County, VT
Wyandotte County (Kansas City), KS
Philadelphia, PA
Jefferson County (Birmingham), AL
Suffolk County (Boston), MA
Dallas County, TX
Bexar County (San Antonio), TX
St. Louis County, MO
Durham County, NC
Arlington County and Falls Church, VA
Berkshire County, MA
Los Angeles County, CA
City and County of San Francisco, CA
Multnomah County (Portland), OR
Hinds County (Jackson), MS
Ninth Judicial Circuit (Orlando), FL
New York County (Manhattan), NY
Travis County (Austin), TX
Oakland County, MI
Pima County (Tucson), AZ
Orleans Parish, LA
Washtenaw County (Ann Arbor), MI
Lorain County, OH
12th Judicial District, CO

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

Pop. (millions) (2020)1
2.27
0.94
0.87
0.78
0.69
0.59
0.14
0.98
5.28
2.74
0.35
4.73
1.17
0.30
0.17
0.17
1.60
0.67
0.80
2.61
2.01
1.00
0.32
0.25
0.13
10.0
0.87
0.82
0.24
1.82
1.69
1.29
1.27
1.04
0.38
0.37
0.31
0.05
50.67
49.07
15.32%
14.80%

Years in Office
2007-present
2007-present
2011-2019
2015-present
2015-present
2015-present
2015-present
2015-present
2016-present
2016-present
2016-present
2017-present
2017-present
2017-present
2017-present
2017-present
2018-present
2018-present
2019-2022
2019-present
2019-present
2019-present
2019-present
2019-present
2019-present
2020-present
2020-2022
2020-present
2020-present
2021-present
2021-present
2021-present
2021-present
2021-present
2021-present
2021-present
2021-present
2021-2022

1

Population data is computed as the total population of the jurisdiction according to the 2020 Census. Users can look up city and county populations on the U.S.
Census Bureau’s website. QuickFacts, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045221 (last visited Oct. 4, 2022).
2
Biography: Dan Satterberg, King Cnty., https://kingcounty.gov/depts/prosecutor/bio.aspx (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); King County, WA: County, Data USA,
https://datausa.io/profile/geo/king-county-wa (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
3
Meet John, John Chisholm, https://www.johnchisholm.org/meet_john (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Milwaukee County, WI: County, Data USA,
https://datausa.io/profile/geo/milwaukee-county-wi (last visited Aug. 4, 2022).
4
Meet George, George Gascon, https://www.georgegascon.org/meet-george/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2022); San Francisco County, CA: County, Data USA,
https://datausa.io/profile/geo/san-francisco-county-ca (last visited Aug. 4, 2022).
5
San Joaquin County: District Attorney’s Office, San Joaquin Cnty., https://www.sjgov.org/department/da/office/admin/tori-verber-salazar (last visited Aug. 4,
2022); San Joaquin County, CA: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/san-joaquin-county-ca (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
6
About the Attorney General, Off. Att’y Gen. for D.C., https://oag.dc.gov/about-oag/our-structure-divisions/about-attorney-general (last visited Aug. 4, 2022);
District of Columbia: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/district-of-columbia-dc (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
7
Marilyn J. Mosby: State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, Off. State’s Att’y for Balt. City, https://www.stattorney.org/office/meet-marilyn-mosby (last visited
Aug. 4, 2022); Baltimore City, MD: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/baltimore-city-md (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
8
District Attorney, MS Dist. Att’y 16th Dist., https://www.msda16.org/scott-colom (last visited Aug. 4, 2022). The Mississippi 16th Judicial District comprises
Clay, Lowndes, Noxubee, and Oktibbeha Counties. Clay County, MS: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/clay-county-ms (last visited
Aug. 4, 2022) (population of 19,640); Lowndes County, MS: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/lowndes-county-ms (last visited Aug. 4,
2022) (59,150); Noxubee County, MS: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/noxubee-county-ms (last visited Aug. 4, 2022) (10,700);
Oktibbeha County, MS: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/oktibbeha-county-ms (last visited Aug. 4, 2022) (49,512).
9
Meet Your Commonwealth’s Attorney, Portsmouth Commonwealth’s Att’y, https://www.portsmouthcwa.com/commonwealths-attorney (last visited Aug. 4,
2022); Portsmouth, VA: Census Place, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/portsmouth-va (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
10
Kimberly M. Foxx, Cook Cnty. State’s Att’y, https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org/about/kimberly-foxx (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Cook County, IL:
County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/cook-county-il (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
11
Eric Gonzalez to Hold Brooklyn DA Office for Remaining Term, News 12 Brooklyn (Oct. 18, 2016), https://brooklyn.news12.com/eric-gonzalez-to-holdbrooklyn-da-office-for-remaining-term-34773227; Brooklyn DA: Eric Gonzalez, Brooklyn Dist. Att’y’s Off., http://www.brooklynda.org/ericgonzalez/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Kings County, NY: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/kings-county-ny (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
12
District Attorney, Nueces Cnty., TX, https://www.nuecesco.com/courts/district-attorney (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); The Most Unlikely D.A. in America,
Politico (May 6, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/06/most-unlikely-district-attorney-in-america-mark-gonzalez-218322/;
Nueces County, TX: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/nueces-county-tx (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
13
Kim Ogg – Harris County District Attorney, Harris Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., https://app.dao.hctx.net/kim-ogg-harris-county-district-attorney (last visited Aug.
4, 2022); Harris County, TX: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/harris-county-tx (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
14
District Attorney Biography, Contra Costa Dist. Att’y, https://www.contracosta.ca.gov/3123/District-Attorney-Biography (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Contra
Costa County, CA: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/contra-costa-county-ca (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
15
Kim Gardner: Circuit Attorney, STLOUIS-MO GOV, https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/circuit-attorney/profiles/kim-gardner.cfm (last
visited Aug. 4, 2022); St. Louis, MO: Census Place, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/st-louis-mo (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
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16

About Sarah, Sarah Fair George: Chittenden Cnty. State’s Att’y, https://www.sarahforstatesattorney.com/about-sarah# (last visited Aug. 4, 2022);
Chittenden County, VT: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/chittenden-county-vt (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
17
Mark A. Dupree Sr.: District Attorney, Unified Gov’t Wyandotte Cnty. & Kan. City, https://www.wycokck.org/Government/Elected-Officials/DistrictAttorney-Biography (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Wyandotte County, KS: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/wyandotte-county-ks (last
visited Aug. 3, 2022).
18
Meet Larry: A True Reformer for Philadelphia, Larry Krasner for Dist. Att’y, https://krasnerforda.com/meet-larry/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Philadelphia,
PA: Census Place, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/philadelphia-pa (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
19
About the District Attorney, Jefferson Cnty. Dist. Att’y, https://www.jeffcoda.org/about.php (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Jefferson County, AL: County, Data
USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/jefferson-county-al (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
20
Press Release, Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’y’s Off., Dist. of Mass., Rachael S. Rollins Sworn in as United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts (Jan.
10, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/rachael-s-rollins-sworn-united-states-attorney-district-massachusetts; Suffolk County, MA: County, Data
USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/suffolk-county-ma (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
21
Meet District Attorney John Creuzot, Dall. Cnty., https://www.dallascounty.org/government/district-attorney/staff/meet-the-da.php (last visited Aug. 4, 2022);
John Creuzot, Dall. Morning News, https://www.dallasnews.com/person/3ec02948-9640-7db2-276c-ad4396269be9/John-Creuzot/ (last visited Aug. 4,
2022); Dallas County, TX: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/dallas-county-tx (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
22
Bexar County District Attorney Joe Gonzales, Bexar Cnty., https://www.bexar.org/1384/District-Attorney (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Joe Gonzales,
Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Joe_Gonzales (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Bexar County, TX: County, Data USA,
https://datausa.io/profile/geo/bexar-county-tx (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
23
A Vision for Justice, St. Louis Prosecuting Att’y, https://www.stlouiscountyprosecutingattorney.com/wesleybell (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); St. Louis County,
MO: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/st-louis-county-mo (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
24
Meet Satana, Re-Elect Satana Deberry Dist. Att’y, https://deberry4da.com/meet-satana/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Priorities, Re-Elect Satana Deberry
Dist. Att’y, https://deberry4da.com/priorities/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Durham County, NC: County, Data USA,
https://datausa.io/profile/geo/durham-county-nc (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
25
Parisa Dehghani-Tafti, Arlington Va., https://www.arlingtonva.us/Government/Departments/Courts/Commonwealth-Attorney/Meet-Parisa (last visited Aug.
4, 2022); Arlington County, VA: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/arlington-county-va (last visited Aug. 3, 2022); Falls Church, VA:
Census Place, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/falls-church-va (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
26
Andrea Harrington, https://andreaharringtonforda.com/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); About Andrea, Andrea Harrington,
https://andreaharringtonforda.com/andreaharrington-story (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Berkshire County, MA: County, Data USA,
https://datausa.io/profile/geo/berkshire-county-ma (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
27
Meet George, supra note 3; Los Angeles County, CA: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/los-angeles-county-ca (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
28
Meet Chesa Boudin, Chesa Boudin, https://www.chesaboudin.com/meet_chesa (last visited Aug. 3, 2022); Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, Public Defender Chesa
Boudin Wins San Francisco D.A. Race in Major Victory for Progressive Prosecutor Movement, Appeal (Nov. 9, 2019), https://theappeal.org/publicdefender-chesa-boudin-wins-san-francisco-da-race-in-major-victory-progressive-prosecutor-movement/; Fatma Khaled, Ousted San Francisco DA
Chesa Boudin Says He Won’t Run for Office This Year, Newsweek (Aug. 4, 2022, 2:42 PM EDT), https://www.newsweek.com/ousted-san-franciscoda-chesa-boudin-says-he-wont-run-office-this-year-1731020; San Francisco County, CA: County, supra note 3.
29
Meet the DA, Multnomah Cnty. Dist. Att’y, https://www.mcda.us/index.php/about-the-da/meet-the-da (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Multnomah County, OR:
County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/multnomah-county-or (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
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30

About, Off. Hinds Cnty. Dist. Att’y, https://hindsda.com/about/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Hinds DA Working to Address Backlog of Cases, Consent
Decree, Northside Sun (Jan. 7, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.northsidesun.com/front-page-slideshow-news-most-recent/hinds-da-working-addressbacklog-cases-consent-decree; Hinds County, MS: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/hinds-county-ms (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
31
About Your State Attorney, Off. State Att’y, Ninth Jud. Cir., https://www.sao9.net/monique-h-worrell.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); Monique Worrell,
Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Monique_Worrell (last visited Aug. 5, 2022). The Florida Ninth Judicial Circuit Court comprises Orange and
Osceola Counties. Orange County, FL: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/orange-county-fl (last visited Aug. 5, 2022) (population of
1.39M); Osceola County, FL: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/osceola-county-fl (last visited Aug. 5, 2022) (375,751).
32
Meet Alvin, Alvin Bragg, https://www.alvinbragg.com/about (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); Alvin Bragg Wins, Becoming First Black D.A. in Manhattan, N.Y.
Times (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/nyregion/alvin-bragg-wins-manhattan-da.html; New York County, NY: County, Data
USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/new-york-county-ny (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
33
Meet the District Attorney, Travis Cnty., https://www.traviscountytx.gov/district-attorney/our-office/meet-the-da (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); Jose Garza:
Travis County District Attorney, Econ. Pol’y Inst., https://www.epi.org/people/jose-garza/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); Travis County, TX: County,
Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/travis-county-tx (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
34
Karen D. McDonald, Oakland Cnty. Mich., https://www.oakgov.com/prosecutor/about/Pages/karen-mcdonald.aspx (last visited Aug. 4, 2022); Oakland
County, MI: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/oakland-county-mi (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
35
Leadership, Pima Cnty. Att’y’s Off., https://www.pcao.pima.gov/pcao-leadership/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); New Pima County Attorney Laura Conover
Begins Tenure with Slate of Reforms, Pima Cnty. Att’y’s Off., https://www.pcao.pima.gov/new-pima-county-attorney-laura-conover-begins-tenurewith-slate-of-reforms/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); Pima County, AZ: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/pima-county-az (last visited Aug.
3, 2022).
36
District Attorney Williams, Orleans Parish Dist. Att’y, https://orleansda.com/district-attorney-williams/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); Orleans Parish, LA:
County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/orleans-parish-la (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
37
Prosecutor Eli Savit, Washtenaw Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., https://www.washtenaw.org/3284/Prosecutor-Eli-Savit (last visited Aug. 5, 2022); Washtenaw
County, MI: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/washtenaw-county-mi (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
38
J.D. Tomlinson ‘Excited’ to Start, Names Leadership Team at Lorain County Prosecutor’s Office, Chronicle (Jan. 5, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://chroniclet.com/news/246889/jd-tomlinson-excited-to-start-names-leadership-team-at-lorain-county-prosecutors-office/; Lorain County, OH:
County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/lorain-county-oh (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).
39
Carol McKinley, Alamosa City Council Approves to Pay for Recall of Controversial San Luis Valley District Attorney, Denver Gazette (July 14, 2022),
https://denvergazette.com/premium/alamosa-city-council-approves-to-pay-for-recall-of-controversial-san-luis-valley-district-attorney/article_a3acb636a58e-11ec-8904-6fbe467e21ba.html; Alonzo Payne Resigns from Post as 12th Judicial District DA, CBS Colo. (July 14, 2022, 7:38 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/alonzo-payne-resigns-12th-judicial-district-da/. The Colorado 12th Judicial District comprises Alamosa,
Conejos, Costilla, Mineral, Rio Grande, and Saguache Counties. Alamosa County, CO: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/alamosacounty-co (last visited Aug. 4, 2022) (population of 16,107); Conejos County, CO: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/conejos-county-co
(last visited Aug. 4, 2022) (8,128); Mineral County, CO: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/mineral-county-co (last visited Aug. 4, 2022)
(824); Rio Grande County, CO: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/rio-grande-county-co (last visited Aug. 4, 2022) (11,305); Saguache
County, CO: County, Data USA, https://datausa.io/profile/geo/saguache-county-co (last visited Aug. 4, 2022) (6,592).
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The total population currently covered by a progressive prosecutor is the sum of all populations in which a progressive prosecutor is still in office at the time of
writing.
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The total population ever covered by a progressive prosecutor. It is the sum of all populations in the table excluding one instance of San Francisco County to
avoid double-counting (San Francisco has two entries in the table).
42
QuickFacts, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045221 (last visited Oct. 4, 2022) (total population of 331,449,281 in
the 2020 Census).
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